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| **Supporting Question 1** |  |
| Featured Source | Source A: Excepts from John Locke’s *Two Treatises on Government* with a focus on “natural rights” |

6. But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of licence;
though man in that state have an uncontrollable liberty to dispose of his
person or possessions, yet he has not liberty to destroy himself, or so
much as any creature in his possession, but where some nobler use than
its bare preservation calls for it. The state of Nature has a law of Nature
to govern it, which obliges every one, and reason, which is that law,
teaches all mankind who will but consult it, that being all equal and
independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or
possessions; for men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent and
infinitely wise Maker; all the servants of one sovereign Master, sent into
the world by His order and about His business; they are His property,
whose workmanship they are made to last during His, not one another’s
pleasure. And, being furnished with like faculties, sharing all in one
community of Nature, there cannot be supposed any such subordination
among us that may authorise us to destroy one another, as if we were
made for one another’s uses, as the inferior ranks of creatures are for
ours. Every one as he is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his
station wilfully, so by the like reason, when his own preservation comes
not in competition, ought he as much as he can to preserve the rest of
mankind, and not unless it be to do justice on an offender, take away or
impair the life, or what tends to the preservation of the life, the liberty,
health, limb, or goods of another.

7. And that all men may be restrained from invading others’ rights,
and from doing hurt to one another, and the law of Nature be observed,
which willeth the peace and preservation of all mankind, the execution
of the law of Nature is in that state put into every man’s hands, whereby
everyone has a right to punish the transgressors of that law to such a
degree as may hinder its violation. For the law of Nature would, as all
other laws that concern men in this world, be in vain if there were nobody
that in the state of Nature had a power to execute that law, and
thereby preserve the innocent and restrain offenders; and if any one in
the state of Nature may punish another for any evil he has done, every
one may do so. For in that state of perfect equality, where naturally
there is no superiority or jurisdiction of one over another, what any may
do in prosecution of that law, everyone must needs have a right to do.

Source:<http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/locke/government.pdf>

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| **Supporting Question 1** |  |
| Featured Source | Source B: Excerpts from John Locke’s *Two Treatises on Government* with a focus on “Social Contract” |

95. Men being, as has been said, by nature all free, equal, and independent,
no one can be put out of this estate and subjected to the political
power of another without his own consent, which is done by agreeing
with other men, to join and unite into a community for their comfortable,
safe, and peaceable living, one amongst another, in a secure enjoyment
of their properties, and a greater security against any that are not
of it. This any number of men may do, because it injures not the freedom
of the rest; they are left, as they were, in the liberty of the state of
Nature. When any number of men have so consented to make one community
or government, they are thereby presently incorporated, and make
one body politic, wherein the majority have a right to act and conclude
the rest.

149. Though in a constituted commonwealth standing upon its own basis
and acting according to its own nature—that is, acting for the preservation
of the community, there can be but one supreme power, which
is the legislative, to which all the rest are and must be subordinate, yet
the legislative being only a fiduciary power to act for certain ends, there
remains still in the people a supreme power to remove or alter the legislative,
when they find the legislative act contrary to the trust reposed in
them. For all power given with trust for the attaining an end being limited
by that end, whenever that end is manifestly neglected or opposed,
the trust must necessarily be forfeited, and the power devolve into the
hands of those that gave it, who may place it anew where they shall
think best for their safety and security. And thus the community perpetually
retains a supreme power of saving themselves from the attempts
and designs of anybody, even of their legislators, whenever they shall be
so foolish or so wicked as to lay and carry on designs against the liberties
and properties of the subject. For no man or society of men having
a power to deliver up their preservation, or consequently the means of
it, to the absolute will and arbitrary dominion of another, whenever any
one shall go about to bring them into such a slavish condition, they will
always have a right to preserve what they have not a power to part with,
and to rid themselves of those who invade this fundamental, sacred, and
unalterable law of self-preservation for which they entered into society.
And thus the community may be said in this respect to be always the
supreme power, but not as considered under any form of government,
because this power of the people can never take place till the government
be dissolved.

192. By the second, the inhabitants of any country, who are descended
and derive a title to their estates from those who are subdued,
and had a government forced upon them, against their free consents,
retain a right to the possession of their ancestors, though they consent
not freely to the government, whose hard conditions were, by force,
imposed on the possessors of that country. For the first conqueror never
having had a title to the land of that country, the people, who are the
descendants of, or claim under those who were forced to submit to the
yoke of a government by constraint, have always a right to shake it off,
and free themselves from the usurpation or tyranny the sword hath
brought in upon them, till their rulers put them under such a frame of
government as they willingly and of choice consent to (which they can
never be supposed to do, till either they are put in a full state of liberty
to choose their government and governors, or at least till they have such
standing laws to which they have, by themselves or their representatives,
given their free consent, and also till they are allowed their due
property, which is so to be proprietors of what they have that nobody
can take away any part of it without their own consent, without which,
men under any government are not in the state of free men, but are direct
slaves under the force of war). And who doubts but the Grecian Christians,
descendants of the ancient possessors of that country, may justly
cast off the Turkish yoke they have so long groaned under, whenever
they have a power to do it?

225. Secondly: I answer, such revolutions happen not upon every
little mismanagement in public affairs. Great mistakes in the ruling part,
many wrong and inconvenient laws, and all the slips of human frailty
will be borne by the people without mutiny or murmur. But if a long
train of abuses, prevarications, and artifices, all tending the same way,
make the design visible to the people, and they cannot but feel what they
lie under, and see whither they are going, it is not to be wondered that
they should then rouse themselves, and endeavour to put the rule into
such hands which may secure to them the ends for which government
was at first erected, and without which, ancient names and specious
forms are so far from being better, that they are much worse than the
state of Nature or pure anarchy; the inconveniences being all as great
and as near, but the remedy farther off and more difficult.

Source:<http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/locke/government.pdf>

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| **Supporting Question 1** |  |
| Featured Source | Source C: Excerpt from Montesquieu’s *The Spirit of Laws*, page 173 |

When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or
in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehensions
may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to
execute them in a tyrannical manner.

Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the
legislative and executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty
of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would be then
the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave
with violence and oppression.

Source:<http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/montesquieu/spiritoflaws.pdf>

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| **Supporting Question 1** |  |
| Featured Source | Source D: Excerpt from Thomas Hobbes’s *Leviathan* |

Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of Warre, where every man is Enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live without other security, than what their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them withall. In such condition, there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain; and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much force; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.

Source:<https://www.gutenberg.org/files/3207/3207-h/3207-h.htm#link2HCH0029>

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| **Supporting Question 1** |  |
| Featured Source | Source E: Excerpt from Thomas Hobbes’s *Leviathan* |

I. The Subjects Cannot Change The Forme Of Government
From this Institution of a Common-wealth are derived all the Rights, and

Facultyes of him, or them, on whom the Soveraigne Power is conferred by the consent of the People assembled.

First, because they Covenant, it is to be understood, they are not obliged by former Covenant to any thing repugnant hereunto. And Consequently they that have already Instituted a Common-wealth, being thereby bound by Covenant, to own the Actions, and Judgements of one, cannot lawfully make a new Covenant, amongst themselves, to be obedient to any other, in any thing whatsoever, without his permission. And therefore, they that are subjects to a Monarch, cannot without his leave cast off Monarchy, and return to the confusion of a disunited Multitude; nor transferre their Person from him that beareth it, to another Man, or other Assembly of men: for they are bound, every man to every man, to Own, and be reputed Author of all, that he that already is their Soveraigne, shall do, and judge fit to be done: so that any one man dissenting, all the rest should break their Covenant made to that man, which is injustice: and they have also every man given the Soveraignty to him that beareth their Person; and therefore if they depose him, they take from him that which is his own, and so again it is injustice. Besides, if he that attempteth to depose his Soveraign, be killed, or punished by him for such attempt, he is author of his own punishment, as being by the Institution, Author of all his Soveraign shall do: And because it is injustice for a man to do any thing, for which he may be punished by his own authority, he is also upon that title, unjust. And whereas some men have pretended for their disobedience to their Soveraign, a new Covenant, made, not with men, but with God; this also is unjust: for there is no Covenant with God, but by mediation of some body that representeth Gods Person; which none doth but Gods Lieutenant, who hath the Soveraignty under God. But this pretence of Covenant with God, is so evident a lye, even in the pretenders own consciences, that it is not onely an act of an unjust, but also of a vile, and unmanly disposition.

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